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Abstract
A recent paper from Brun et al. has argued that access to a closed
timelike curve (CTC) would allow for the possibility of perfectly dis-
tinguishing nonorthogonal quantum states. This result can be used to
develop a protocol for instantaneous nonlocal signaling. Several com-
menters have argued that nonlocal signaling must fail in this and in
similar cases, often citing consistency with relativity as the justifica-
tion. I argue that this objection fails to rule out nonlocal signaling in
the presence of a CTC. I argue that the reason these authors are moti-
vated to exclude the prediction of nonlocal signaling is because the No
Signaling principle is considered to a fundamental part of the formula-
tion of the quantum information approach. I draw out the relationship
between nonlocal signaling, quantum information, and relativity, and
argue that the principle theory formulation of quantum mechanics,
which is at the foundation of the quantum information approach, is
in tension with foundational assumptions of Deutschs D-CTC model,
on which this protocol is based.
1 Introduction
Quantum information theory (QIT) has been a majorly productive research
program over the last two decades. It has enabled scientists to make progress
theoretically, experimentally, and in terms of the development of technology.
However, our understanding of what quantum information is telling us about
the world—and what it is telling us about quantum theory itself—remains
underdeveloped. Broadly speaking, this paper is an attempt to reconcile the
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conceptual framework at play in the metaphysical approach to the founda-
tions of quantum mechanics with the framework at play in quantum infor-
mation science.
In this paper, I focus on a debate about the predicted behavior of quantum
systems in the presence of a localized region of spacetime subject to nonlinear
laws of evolution. The particular example under consideration is that of a
closed timelike curve, or CTC. In this literature, the peculiarities of how
time travel could possibly be achieved are not addressed. Rather, CTCs are
treated as a resource. In this context, we can formulate the question “what
could we do if we had access to a CTC?”
David Deutsch’s seminal 1991 paper [8] set the groundwork for a quantum
mechanical analysis of the information-processing capabilities of a quantum
system augmented by access to a CTC. Over the last decade, interest has
flourished in the particular computational tasks that can be achieved with
a CTC-assisted quantum computer circuit. However, a debate has arisen
surrounding a particularly strange result: the ability to distinguish non-
orthogonal quantum states. This is impossible according to ordinary quan-
tum theory, but the Deutsch’s analysis of the behavior of quantum systems
in the presence of a CTC seems to predict it.1 Furthermore, this ability leads
to an even more radical conclusion: quantum CTCs allow for information to
be sent between arbitrarily distant parties instantaneously.
However, there has been serious resistance to this conclusion from vari-
ous parties to the debate. And the attempts to formulate exactly why this
admittedly non-quantum-mechanical behavior should be ruled out has illu-
minated the underlying assumptions that are often at play, even in a field
such as quantum information, which purports to be formulated entirely in
operationalist terms, and neutral with respect to interpretational debates.
A CTC-assisted quantum computational circuit may seem like an exotic
example. But analyzing these kinds of systems has proved to be very fruitful.
Working with this example has brought to light several common confusions
about one of the central concepts of quantum theory: nonlocality. In the
1In this paper, I will be working exclusively with Deutsch’s CTC model for quantum
systems (D-CTCs). There is an alternative proposal for how to understand the behavior
of quantum systems in the presence of CTCs, referred to as P-CTCs. While there are
significant differences between the predictions and underlying physics of the two proposals,
both allow for the behavior under consideration in this paper, i.e. distinguishing non-
orthogonal states, and Nonlocal Signaling. In fact, Gisin showed [11] that a more general
nonlinear framework would allow for the same behavior.
2
foundations literature, quantum nonlocality is often closely connected to the
concepts of information and causation. For example, it is often said that the
nonlocal correlations of quantum mechanics are allowed at spacelike separa-
tion because no information is traveling between the two distant systems A
and B faster than a light signal could. In cases where nonlocality is exploited
as an information channel (as in the quantum teleportation protocol) then
quantum information is not present (or useable) at B until after a classical
(lightlike) signal is received from A.
I will argue that the exploitation of quantum correlations to send a
message—as seemingly allowed by the existence of CTCs—is not itself in-
consistent with relativity. The relativistic constraints that disallow signaling
do so because of the potential to send information to the past, giving rise to
the possibility of a paradox. I will argue, however, that Deutsch’s consistency
condition, which constrains the possible nonlinear evolution of systems inter-
acting with closed loops of information on CTCs such that no contradiction
can obtain, should apply to this “radio to the past” as well.
The predicted existence of instantaneous signaling is contrary to a foun-
dational principle of the quantum information-theoretic approach. The No-
Signaling Principle plays a fundamental role in the formulation of quan-
tum information. I argue that this accounts for the resistance to the con-
clusion that it can be violated under certain conditions. Furthermore, I
argue that the No-Signaling Principle’s inclusion as a fundamental postu-
late about the nature of the quantum world, as is the case in the quantum
information-theoretic interpretation of quantum theory, as advocated in Bub
and Pitowsky’s “Two Dogmas About Quantum Mechanics”, represents a
commitment to a principle-theoretic conception of quantum theory.
Whereas a “constructive” theory is built up from its ontology and dynam-
ics, the fundamental formulation of a “principle” theory is “top-down”, in
terms of inviolable global principles (the paradigm case is special relativity).
Principle theories explicitly deny the fundamentality of a theory’s ontology,
and consider constructive formulations of theories to be secondary, and to
have a role only as proofs of the consistency of their principles.
This paper will examine the recent debate surrounding this point in the
foundations literature. I will address the relativistic argument for the impos-
sibility of superluminal signaling. That argument fails to apply in the context
of this example, and I will argue that there is a deeper motivation at play for
ruling out the possibility of signaling, which has to do with the fundamental
commitments of the quantum information approach. I argue, however, that
3
the framework developed by Deutsch is inconsistent with these commitments,
and therefore the justification for including a No Signaling principle in the
D-CTC framework offered by quantum information theorists is indefensible.
2 Deutsch’s Circuit Model for CTCs
In his well known 1991 paper [8], Deutsch introduced a model for the analysis
of the physical behavior of CTCs. Prior to his work, the standard way of
analyzing the physical effects of chronology-violating regions of spacetime
was in terms of their underlying geometry. Deutsch considered this approach
to be insufficient because it fails to take quantum mechanical effects into
account. He proposed an alternative approach which involves analyzing the
behavior of CTCs in terms of their information processing capabilities.
He begins his account by defining a notion of equivalence between spacetime-
bounded networks containing chronology-violating regions. A network in this
context is to be understood as a spacetime geometry which takes as input the
initial state of a physical system and outputs the system’s final state. Two
networks are denotationally equivalent if their outputs are the same function
of their inputs. That is to say, regardless of whether two networks have dif-
fering spacetime geometries, if the function that maps their initial states to
their final states is the same, they are denotationally equivalent.
Next he introduces the idea that the transformation between any two
denotationally equivalent networks is trivial. Insofar as we are interested
in analyzing CTCs in terms of their physical effects (that is, their output
given a certain input), we are free to use the simplest model available in the
denotational equivalence class of a particular network for the purpose of our
analysis of the information flow through a CTC.
The final step of his proposal is to introduce a simple standard form
into which any spacetime-bounded network can be trivially transformed for
the purpose of analysis. The simple standard form involves translating all
spacetime-bounded networks into circuits in which each particle traveling in
the original network is replaced by sufficiently many carrier particles, each of
which have a single 2-state internal degree of freedom (a bit). The regions in
which the particles interact are localized (by denotationally trivial transfor-
mations) into gates, such that the states of the particles so not evolve while
traveling between them. And finally, all chronology-violating effects of the
network are localized to sufficiently many carrier particles on closed loops,
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which only interact with chronology-respecting particles in gates.
Deutsch points out that chronology violation itself makes no difference
to the behavior of a network unless there is a closed loop of information.
In the original network, this closed information path could potentially not
be confined to the trajectory of any single particle (since the carriers can
interact with each other), but for any such network, there is a denotationally
trivial transformation which will localize the closed loop of information on
sufficiently many carriers on closed paths.
The real innovation of this approach is that it can very easily accommo-
date quantum mechanical effects by relaxing the requirement that the carrier
particles be in a well-defined classical state after interactions. If viewed clas-
sically, networks containing chronology violations can lead to paradoxes that
seem to put unnaturally strong constraints on possible initial conditions of
physical systems (e.g. you are somehow prohibited from getting in the time
machine that would take you back to kill your grandfather). Deutsch uses
his model to argue that, when quantum mechanics is taken into account,
these unnatural constraints on initial states disappear. Deutsch’s fixed point
theorem states that CTCs “place no retrospective constraints on the state
of a quantum system” [8]. That is to say, for any possible input state, there
will be a paradox-free solution.
This is the result of a consistency condition implied by the quantum
mechanical treatment of time-traveling carrier particles interacting with later
versions of themselves. If we let |ψ〉 be the initial state of the “younger”
version of the carrier particle, and let ρˆ be the density operator of the “older”
version of the carrier particle, then the joint density operator of the two
particles entering the region of interaction is
|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρˆ (1)
and the density operator of the two carrier particles after the interaction is
U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρˆ)U † (2)
where U is the interaction unitary. The consistency condition requires that
the density operator of the younger version of the carrier particle as it leaves
the region of interaction is the same as that of the older version as it enters
the region of interaction.
This makes intuitive sense, because it is the interaction that causes the
earlier version of the carrier particle to become the later version. When trans-
lated via a denotationally trivial transformation to a network in which the
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chronology-violating behavior is localized to a single particle on a CTC that
interacts with a chronology-respecting (CR) carrier particle, the consistency
condition for the CTC system is
ρCTC = TrCR[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρCTC)U †]. (3)
This requirement says that, after tracing out the CR qubit, the density op-
erator of the system on the CTC after the interaction is the same as it was
before the interaction. That is to say, after the interaction, the carrier parti-
cle on the CTC enters the “future mouth” of the CTC, and exits the “past
mouth” of the CTC before the interaction. The state of the particle that
comes out of the past mouth must be the same as the system that enters the
future mouth.2 Furthermore, ρCTC depends on |ψ〉, so the input state on the
causality-respecting carrier particle has an effect on the state of the particle
it will interact with.
The output of the circuit (i.e. the final state of the CR qubits) depends on
the input of system |ψ〉 and ρCTC. And, as we see in the previous equation,
ρCTC itself depends on |ψ〉. Therefore, the evolution of the CR qubit is
nonlinear with respect to the input |ψ〉.
ρoutput = TrCTC[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρCTC)U †]. (4)
Whatever the physical situation is, its information flow can be redescribed
in a form that has the following features: There are a finite number of qubits
bound to a CTC. These interact via unitaries with a finite number of qubits
that follow an ordinary chronology–respecting trajectory. The CR qubits
are measured after their interaction with the CTC qubits, and their state is
the final state of the system. In the region of interaction, the CTC qubits
behave according to ordinary quantum mechanics, and interact with the CR
qubits via unitary interactions. The CTC qubits do not evolve in any way
while traveling back along the CTC. The nonlinearity of the systems overall
evolution is entirely due to the consistency conditions nonlinearity.
This means that the closed information loops of chronology violation
can be isolated into localized regions of spacetime. The effects that can be
generated by interaction with the CTC can range over all of space, of course.
2Because the procedure involves taking the partial trace of the system, and requiring
consistency for only the state of the system bound to the CTC, any entanglement with
systems in CR region is broken when the CTC-bound quibit exits the past mouth of the
CTC.
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But they must be the result of entanglement, or prior causal interaction, with
systems in the region of interaction with the chronology violating qubits.
In light of the model’s reliance on this nonlinear consistency condition,
Deutsch’s claim that CTCs, when properly understood, place no constraints
on the possible states of the quantum system may be stronger than is war-
ranted. While it is true that, unlike the classical analysis of time travel
paradoxes, his model places no constraints on the input state of the causality-
respecting system, it does constrain the possible states of the system confined
to the CTC.
While Deutsch’s solution seems more intuitively plausible than the con-
straint on initial conditions that prevents the occurrence of classical time
travel paradoxes, it is nonetheless puzzling. In the classical case, it is some-
how forbidden that I get in the time machine that will take me back to kill
my grandfather. There isn’t necessarily any obvious causal mechanism that
prevents me. It is simply impossible, to avoid paradox, that I ever actually
carry out my mission. This constraint is often described as superdeterminis-
tic, since it is something above and beyond simple determinism that rules out
the possibility of me getting into the time machine. David Lewis’s influen-
tial formulation of the classical consistency condition from his [13] alleviates
some of this tension by redescribing the time travel narrative as a single,
self-consistent history. The drawback of this approach is that it seriously
undermines the notion that the time traveler has free will.
Deutsch characterizes his problem with the classical solutions as stem-
ming from the fact that they violate what he calls the principle of autonomy.
According to this principle, it is possible to create in our immedi-
ate environment any configuration of matter the laws of physics
permit locally, without reference to what the rest of the universe
may be doing. [9]
He claims that classical solutions to the Grandfather Paradox, which impose
global consistency, violate this principle.
Under this principle, the world outside the laboratory can phys-
ically constrain our actions inside, even if everything we do is
consistent, locally, with the laws of physics. Ordinarily we are
unaware of this constraint, because the autonomy and consis-
tency principles never come into conflict. But classically, in the
presence of CTCs, they do. [9]
7
Although Deutsch’s reference to the principle of autonomy makes it seem
as though his problem with the classical solutions is that they always rule
out certain initial conditions of an experiment involving a CTC, this can’t
be quite right. For most initial setup conditions, including those trajectories
that seem to entail a Grandfather Paradox, there is a fixed–point solution
which shows that there is a self-consistent sequence of events that will avoid
the paradoxical outcome. Often these solutions involve a self-interaction that
changes the state of the younger system heading toward the future mouth
of the CTC, such that when it exists the past mouth, it is no longer on
a trajectory that will prevent it from time traveling. Novikov explains this
class of solutions in terms of billiard ball entering the future mouth of a CTC
on a trajectory that will lead to a collision with itself in the past, preventing
it from entering the future mouth.
If we take into account the collision from the very beginning, then
the collision is very weak, just a slight touch between the two balls
that nudges the younger ball only slightly. The younger ball then
moves along a trajectory slightly different from our expectation,
but still enters mouth B. It reappears from mouth A in the past
and continues along its motion, still on a trajectory that differs
only slightly from the trajectory it would have traveled on had
it not suffered a collision. The result of the slight difference in
trajectory is that the collision with the younger version of itself
is not a strong collision, but rather a weak collision, a glancing
blow. Therefore we have a consistent solution. [16]
There are some situations with which Deutsch is concerned that he claims
do not have a classical fixed point. For example, the classical bit in the system
depicted in Figure 1. After exiting the past mouth of the CTC, the system
encounters a NOT gate, which flips its state. It then enters the future mouth,
and repeats the process. Classically, this system would oscillate between the
two values allowed.3
In the quantum version of this circuit, however, there is a unique fixed
3Deutsch admits that discreteness in the classical domain is an approximation, so per-
haps an argument could be made that the fixed point of such a system would involve a
failure of the gate to operate properly. But assuming everything works as advertised, there
is no classical fixed point.
8
Figure 1: A classical bit bound to a CTC with a NOT gate. In this example, there is
no classical fixed point solution.
point. If the qubit is in the mixed state
1
2
(|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|) (5)
the consistency is satisfied.4
The classical fixed point solutions show that in most cases, you are not
constrained in terms of the initial setup conditions of your experiment. For
most input states, there is at least one self-consistent sequence of events that
can follow. I believe Deutsch is concerned with the fact that we are not free,
even in light of the classical fixed–point solutions, to send a system in any
state we choose into the CTC. The classical fixed–point solutions involve a
self-interaction before the input system enters the future mouth of the CTC.
This, I believe, is at the heart of Deutsch’s discomfort with the classical
solutions to the paradoxes of time travel.
In Deutsch’s model, this tension is seemingly resolved. A system in any
state is allowed to enter the CTC—the time traveler could enter the time
machine with any intentions whatsoever. Consistency is guaranteed by the
state of the system confined to the CTC. This doesn’t offend the intuitions as
badly as the classical case, because we can imagine the following pseudotime
narrative: The causality-respecting qubit begins its journey in some initial
state, then encounters and interacts with CTC qubit, precipitating a change
of state of both of them. The CTC qubit in its new state then travels back in
4As is true in the classical case, most fixed–point solutions in the D-CTC model are not
unique. However, the information flow in this circuit is at the heart of the Grandfather
Paradox, and is therefore especially important for Deutsch’s goal to show that his model
can solve the paradoxes of time travel. The BHW circuit, with which we will be concerned
in the following, also has a unique fixed–point solution.
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time to again interact with the causality-respecting qubit (in its initial state),
and the interaction again changes the state of the CTC qubit. Over infinite
iterations of this process, the CTC qubit converges on some particular state,
like the rotation of a top stabilizes after some initial wobbling. The CR qubit
causes the CTC qubit to be in the right state.
The puzzle arises, though, when we note that the CTC qubit must always
have been in this stable state. There are no previous interactions with the
CR qubit to force it to evolve over time into the right state. So although
Deutsch’s model has avoided the superdeterminism of the traditional time
travel paradoxes, which constrained the initial states of the CR system, it
seems to have introduced significant kinematic constraints in another place.
Something like Novikov’s classical consistency condition must still be at play.
That is to say, there must be a deeper metaphysical justification (i.e. the im-
possibility of a self-contradictory history) which is behind Deutcsh’s quantum
condition. And as we’ll see in Section 5.2, Deutsch seemingly has something
like this in mind.
Deutsch’s solution relies on allowing the system confined to the CTC to
exist in a mixed state. Another puzzle arises when attempting to interpret
what this can mean if, for example, there is only one CTC-bound qubit.
As we’ll see, the interpretation Deutsch gives of these mixed states relies on
deep metaphysical commitments. The justification both for the existence of
the consistency condition and for the existence of mixed states on the CTC
comes from prior philosophical considerations Deutsch presupposes in the
construction of his model.
Deutsch’s analysis of the physical effects of chronology-violating regions
of spacetime in terms of quantum computational circuits and the consistency
condition has been very influential in the study of quantum information, and
has led to many interesting insights about the nature of the quantum world.
One particularly interesting result is due to Brun, Harrington and Wilde. In
what follows, I will discuss their work, the debate surrounding their central
claim, and further implications of their argument.
3 The BHW Circuit
Brun, Harrington, and Wilde, in their 2009 paper [3], describe a procedure
for using CTC-assisted quantum computational circuits to distinguish be-
tween non-orthogonal states of a qubit. Ordinary linear quantum mechanics
10
does not allow for such a discrimination to take place. It is only in the
presence of certain kinds of nonlinear evolutions that nonorthogonal states
can be projected onto orthogonal bases, making them reliably experimentally
distinguishable. In this section, I will describe the protocol for distinguish-
ing between the linearly dependent BB84 states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |−〉, where
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉).
3.1 Details of the BHW Circuit
The authors begin by detailing a protocol for distinguishing between two non-
orthogonal states. The setup involves two qubits: system A in the unknown
initial state |ψ〉 (either |0〉 or |−〉), and system B, a qubit in some state ρCTC
on a CTC. The procedure is simple: (1) perform a SWAP of systems A
and B, (2) perform a controlled-Hadamard transformation with system A as
the control and system B as the target, and (3) measure system A in the
computational basis. A measurement of system A that yields the output |0〉
means that the input state is |ψ〉 = |0〉. A measurement of system A that
yields the output |1〉 means that the input state is |ψ〉 = |−〉.
This result obtains because of Deutsch’s consistency condition. Whatever
state system B is in when it enters the future mouth of the CTC must be
the same state that comes out of the past mouth of the CTC. That is, steps
(1) and (2) must have no net effect on system B. The density matrix of the
system on the CTC (system B) depends on the the input state of system A,
as shown in equation 3. The final state of the CR qubits depend on the input
state of system A and on ρCTC, as shown in equation 4. Since the only two
possible input states are |ψ〉 = |0〉 and |ψ〉 = |−〉, the consistency condition
requires that the only possible initial states of system B are ρCTC = |0〉 〈0|
and ρCTC = |1〉 〈1|.
Figure 2: BHW circuit for distinguishing between |ψ〉 = |0〉 and |ψ〉 = |−〉 (from Brun
et al. 2009).
Consider the situation where the input state of system A is |ψ〉 = |0〉.
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If the initial state of system B is ρCTC = |1〉 〈1|, then the effect of the first
gate (SWAP ) would be to transform system A into the state state |1〉 and
system B into the state |0〉. Since system A is in the state |1〉, the action of
the second gate (controlled-Hadamard with A as the control and B as the
target) would transform system B into the state |+〉. Since the consistency
condition requires that the state of B after the action of the two gates is the
same as the state of B before the action of the two gates, it is clear that
ρCTC = |1〉 〈1| is not an allowed initial state of system B when |ψ〉 = |0〉.
However, if the initial state of system B were ρCTC = |0〉 〈0|, then after the
action of the first gate (SWAP ), system A would be in state |0〉 and system B
would be in state |0〉. The second gate (controlled-Hadamard) would not be
activated since the control qubit is in state |0〉, so the consistency condition
for system B holds. The measurement of system A would yield a result of
|0〉, which indicates that the initial input state was |ψ〉 = |0〉.
Now consider the case where system A is initially in the state |ψ〉 = |−〉.
If the initial state of system B is ρCTC = |0〉 〈0|, then after the action of
the first gate (SWAP ), system A would be in the state |0〉 and system B
would be in the state |−〉. Since A is the control qubit for the second gate
(controlled-Hadamard), it would not be activated and system B would pass
through unchanged. It would therefore enter the future mouth of the CTC
in the state |−〉, violating the consistency condition.
However, if system B had initially been in the state |1〉, after the first
gate, system A would be in the state |1〉 and system B would be in the state
|−〉. The control qubit would activate the controlled-Hadamard gate, and
system B would be transformed into the state |1〉, which is consistent with
its original state. The measurement on system A will yield a result of |1〉,
which indicates that the input was initially |ψ〉 = |−〉.
Brun and his collaborators were able to scale this protocol up to allow
for the discrimination between the four non-orthogonal BB84 states |0〉, |1〉,
|+〉 and |−〉. They achieve this by adding an ancillary chronology-respecting
qubit in the state |0〉, using two CTC-bound qubits, performing two SWAPs
and four controlled unitary transformations, and making two measurements.
The unitary transformations are as follows:
U00 ≡ SWAP
U01 ≡ X ⊗X
U10 ≡ (X ⊗ I) ◦ (H ⊗ I)
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Figure 3: BHW circuit for distinguishing the four BB84 states (from Brun et al. 2009).
U11 ≡ (X ⊗H) ◦ (SWAP)
The circuit performs the following map (|ψ0〉 → |ab〉):
|00〉 → |00〉
|10〉 → |01〉
|+0〉 → |10〉
|−0〉 → |11〉
3.2 Using BHW to Signal
In Cavalcanti et al.’s [7], the authors point out that the evolution of the
quantum state through the BHW circuit which allows for the possibility of
distinguishing the BB84 states is of the right kind to fit into a protocol for
instantaneous signaling proposed by Gisin [11].
Gisin’s proposal involves two players, Alice and Bob, each sharing one half
of a singlet pair. Alice measures her particle either in the X direction (yield-
ing |1〉 or |0〉) or the Z direction (yielding |+〉 or |−〉), forcing Bob’s particle
into the same state. Bob then subjects his particle to a nonlinear evolution
of a certain type that allows him to determine its state. Gisin proposed a
particular nonlinear Hamiltonian that would do the job, but Cavalcanti and
Menicucci point out that the BHW circuit has the right features to fit into
this framework.
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Figure 4: The method for using the BHW circuit in Gisin’s instantaneous signaling
device. Alice measures first measures her particle along the X or Z axis. Bob then uses
the BHW circuit to determine what state his particle is in.
The BHW circuit will allow Bob to perfectly distinguish between all four
states. Therefore, if Alice wants to send a 1-bit message, she can choose either
to measure in the X direction (for “yes”) or the Z direction (for “no”). Bob,
using the BHW circuit, can recover Alice’s message, which is transmitted
instantaneously. That is, if the output of Bob’s device is |10〉 or |11〉, he
knows Alice measured her half of the singlet pair in the X direction (intending
the message to be “yes”), and if his results are either |00〉 or |01〉, he knows
she measured in the Z direction (meaning “no”).
3.3 The Bub-Stairs Consistency Condition
In a recent paper [5] Jeffrey Bub and Allen Stairs propose a consistency
condition to solve one of the outstanding conceptual problems with Nonlocal
Signaling. Their condition solves some potential ambiguity associated with
the possibility of signaling.
The issue that the consistency condition is designed to solve arises be-
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cause of the fact that the nature of Nonlocal Signaling allows for cause/effect
to happen at spacelike separation. Alice’s choice of measurement causes Bob
to get the result he does faster than a light signal would have been able to
traverse the distance. Since the event of Alice’s input and the event of Bob’s
output are at spacelike separation, observers in different frames will disagree
about which event comes before the other.That is, for some observers, Bob
will measure his particle before Alice measures hers. In those frames, Alice
and Bob’s shared Bell State will not have been disentangled by Alice’s mea-
surement, and therefore Bob will input a particle in the state I/2 into the
BHW circuit, which will yield any of the four possible outcomes with equal
probability, meaning that he has a 1/2 probability, in that frame, of getting
an output that corresponds to the wrong input for Alice. In frames where
Alice measures first, her choice determines Bob’s output by disentangling
their shared Bell State, leading to Bob measuring a particle in a definite
state with the BHW circuit. In frames where Bob measures first, he inputs
his still-entangled particle into the BHW circuit, yielding each of the four
possible outputs with equal probability, regardless of the input Alice later
chooses.
To protect against this sort of problem, they introduce a simple and ele-
gant new consistency condition. It consists of the conjunction of the following
two claims:
(C1) Observers in differently moving reference frames agree on which events
occur, even if they disagree about the order of events.
(C2) If an event has zero probability in any frame of reference, it does not
occur.
C1 ensures the two observers would agree about the outcomes of the two
measurements (namely that the output Bob gets corresponds to the input
Alice makes, regardless of who goes first). C2 ensures that the contradic-
tion will never arise, since according to one observer, the probability of Bob
getting the outcome that is inconsistent with Alice’s input is 0.
While the consistency condition seems unobjectionable, I’ll argue in Sec-
tion 5.3 that the conclusions Bub and Stairs attempt to draw from it are
more problematic.
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4 Signaling and Relativity
It’s not uncommon at this point in the discussion for the argument to be
made that relativity prohibits signaling. Consistency with special relativity
is taken to rule out the possibility of superluminal causal influence, or su-
perluminal information transfer, both of which feature in the BHW signaling
protocol. However, it has been argued convincingly in a number of places
that the sending of superluminal signals is itself inconsistent with relativity.
For example, Maudlin showed in [14] that there are hypersurfaces of super-
luminal signal reception that are Lorentz invariant. Furthermore, he argues
that even in the case of a locus of reception that falls along the simultaneity
surface defined by the state of motion of the emission source of the signal,
there isn’t a direct contradiction with relativistic constraints.
On the other hand, Relativity per se in no way constraints case-
1 signals. It is consistent even with case-1 superluminal signals
which propagate instantaneously (i.e. along a flat space-like hy-
perplane). But the hyperplane must be in part determined by
the state of the emitter, or of some other matter. [14]
What is problematic from a relativistic point of view is the fact that infor-
mation can be sent to the past by chaining together superluminal signals,
and in so doing, we apparently give rise to the possibility of contradictions
(like the Grandfather Paradox).5 For example, Timpson says
The constraint is that superluminal signalling is ruled out on
pain of temporal loop paradoxes. What this means is that no
physical process is permissible that would allow a signal to be
sent superluminally and thus allow information to be transmitted
superluminally. [18]
This view is typical (see e.g. [14] and [15]).
5The simple objection that superluminal signaling would violate relativity because the
information is “traveling faster than light” can be answered by pointing out that there
is nothing about exploiting quantum nonlocality to sent usable information that requires
that a carrier of information physically traverses the space between the communicating
parties. Quantum teleportation arguably involves sending quantum information (in the
form of the unknown state |ψ〉) faster than light from Alice to Bob, though in order for Bob
to use it, a two–bit classical message must be sent at subluminal speeds. See Timpson’s
discussion of teleportation in [18].
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It would be possible to prevent this outcome by defining a privileged
Lorentz frame in which the signals could travel their maximum (potentially
infinite) speed, and in all other frames, it travels at lower speeds. However,
there is some disagreement about whether this solution would itself be in
conflict with relativity. Maudlin says that a situation in which there is a
privileged frame, a “fundamental relativity principle would be violated” [14].
Nicolas Gisin disagrees, saying it does not violate relativity.
However, the assumption of a universal privileged reference frame
with respect to which a faster than light influence can be defined,
is not in contradiction with relativity. [12]
In this context, Gisin develops another series of models of superluminal causal
influence, arguing that the existence of such an influence can always be ex-
ploited for superluminal signaling.
Another possible solution to the problem of contradictions following from
the ability to send information to the past is to impose some philosophically–
motivated condition to rule out inconsistent histories. This is exactly the
function of consistency conditions in discussions of chronology violation.
Classical discussions of CTCs include versions of the Novikov condition. And
Deutsch’s consistency condition is a quantum analogue. Maudlin claims that
any condition that could rule out temporal paradoxes in the context of su-
perluminal signaling would most likely be in contradiction to relativity.
So the choice we have is not between superluminal signals and
Relativity but between superluminal signals which allow for loops
and Relativity. If we can argue that loops are impossible, then
accepting the signals means positing extra structure to space-time
to forbid them, structure that looks suspiciously like an absolute
notion of simultaneity. [14]
Therefore, any attempt of this kind would be in conflict with relativity.
Whether a CTC consistency condition is equivalent to a privileged refer-
ence frame is an interesting question, but is beyond the scope of the present
work.
Here it will suffice to say that the origin of the superluminal signaling
in this debate is from the assumption that CTCs behave in such a way
that Deutsch’s consistency condition holds. It is the consistency condition
that induces the nonlinear evolution that leads to the ability to distinguish
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the BB84 states. However, there is the question of whether the D-CTC
consistency condition should apply to information sent to the past in this
way. Deutsch’s model is motivated by the possible existence of CTCs as
understood from a relativistic point of view. He mentions the consistency of
wormholes with general relativity in the setup of his argument. But he also
explicitly abstracts away from these spacetime structures in developing his
model. He considers CTCs to be characterized by a closed path of informa-
tion. If there is no closed path for information, then there is a denotationally
trivial transformation that can eliminate all negative time delays. A space-
time that contains any effect of a closed loop of information is subject to his
analysis.
Negative delay components in the model play the role of time
machines, which I define in general as objects in which some phe-
nomenon characteristic only of chronology violation can reliably
be observed. [...] The basic method of this paper is to regard
computations as representative physical processes—representing
the behavior of general physical systems under the unfamiliar
circumstances of chronology violation. [8]
According to Deutsch, any physical system in which there is a closed loop
of information can be represented as a CTC-supplemented computational
circuit. Though he never explicitly addresses this issue, from what has been
said, it seems clear that this should also apply to cases where the closed loop
of information is made possible by the prior existence of a CTC, and the loop
exists outside of what was originally taken to be the region of interaction.
[Um, can you transform a simple signaling setup into the standard form?]
So it seems that objections to signaling in the context of this debate
cannot rely purely on the claim that it is inconsistent with relativity. But
the debate surrounding the BHW circuit and related results includes people
making this claim (see e.g. [2] and [6]). I will argue in the next section that
this reluctance to allow superluminal signaling is in part motivated by the
status of the No-Signaling principle in quantum information theory. I will
argue that this way of thinking about quantum mechanics is in tension with
the fundamental commitments that underwrite Deutsch’s D-CTC model.
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5 Quantum Information-Theoretic Motivations
5.1 Why Maintain No Signaling?
I’ve argued that the relativistic justification for the No-Signaling Principle
doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. I will argue that the reason for the reticence to
give up the No-Signaling Principle has to do with its status in the QIT. In
particular, it is one of the most promising principles used in the reconstruc-
tions of quantum theory from the space of generalized probabilistic theories.
This research project considers the space of all possible theories formulated
in terms of their information processing capabilities and their allowed corre-
lations between events.
For any theory, whether it applies to Nature or not, one can
consider the information processing possibilities of this theory, the
differences from those of classical or quantum theory, and attempt
to trace these possibilities back to the fundamental features of the
theory. [1]
Principles are introduced, which partition the theories in that generalized
theory space. The hope is that a small number of physically plausible prin-
ciples can be identified which will pick out exactly those correlations allowed
by quantum theory. On this view, these principles would give us an answer to
the question of why our world allows for the quantum correlations to obtain,
and not others.
No Signaling is one of the core principles at the heart of this approach.
If the privileged status of the No Signaling principle were to be undermined,
that would in turn undermine the status of other principles promising for this
project, which live or die with No Signaling. One such example is the princi-
ple of “information causality”, which generalizes the No Signaling principle
in the following way. If Alice sends Bob m classical bits, the most classical
information Bob can extract from that message is m bits. This reduces to
the No Signaling principle in the case where m = 0 [17]. This is consistent
with the teleportation protocol because, even though Alice can send Bob a
quantum state that would take a potentially infinite amount of classical in-
formation to perfectly specify, Bob cannot extract more than the 2 classical
bits Alice sent to him. Having Alice’s input state |ψ〉 in hand does not give
Bob any more information.
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This approach is closely associated with the principle-based conception of
physical theories. This is a conception in which the fundamental formulation
of a physical theory is in terms of principled restrictions on the kinematical
level. These principles never need to be justified by ontological or dynam-
ical considerations. An empirically equivalent theory theory formulated in
terms of dynamics and ontology is taken on this approach to represent a less
fundamental formulation.
The special theory of relativity is taken to be the paradigm example of
this kind of theory. Just as the Principle of Relativity and the Light Postulate
pick out Minkowski spacetime as the space of events in SR, and constrain the
structure of events in spacetime, the information-theoretic interpretation of
quantum theory take there to be principles that define a space of events for
quantum theory, and that space to constrain the structure of those events.
In the case of quantum mechanics, these principles are information-
theoretic and include a ‘no signaling’ principle and a ‘no cloning’
principle. The structure of Hilbert space imposes kinematic (i.e.
pre-dymanic) objective probabilistic constraints on events to which
a quantum dynamics of matter and fields is required to conform,
through its symmetries [...]. [4]
And, as with relativity, they hold that there is no deeper explanation of the
structure of events than that they are subject to the constraints embodied
in the principles.
There is no deeper explanation for the quantum phenomena of in-
terference and entanglement than that provided by the structure
of Hilbert space, just as there is no deeper explanation for the
relativistic phenomena of Lorentz contraction and time dilation
than that provided by the structure of Minkowski spacetime. [4]
In most cases these two ways of formulating a theory (principle and con-
structive) don’t come into any kind of conflict. But in the case of the nonlin-
ear extensions of quantum theory, the principle version of the theory makes
different predictions than the constructive version. Following the dynam-
ics of the systems under consideration leads us to conclude that signaling
is effected in the BHW circuit. But this is in explicit conflict with the No-
Signaling Principle.
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Proponents of the principle theoretic interpretation of quantum theory,
like Bub and Pitowsky in [4], argue that there is a strict distinction between
principle and constructive conceptions of physical theories. Either a theory
is fundamentally formulated in terms of principles, or it is constructed from
an ontology and dynamics. From the principle conception every explanation
must reduce to the principles. And from the constructive conception, all
principles must be explainable in terms of the ontology and dynamics.
5.2 Deutsch’s Metaphysics
The core claim of this argument is that Deutsch’s model requires a commit-
ment to a deeper metaphysical picture than the principle–theoretic approach
can support. I will argue in this section that Deutsch relies on a metaphysical
commitment that goes beyond the standard Everettt interpretation, and it
plays an ineliminable role in the predictions of the D-CTC model.
Deutsch frequently makes reference to the “multiverse” as the spacetime
in which the events that solve the paradoxes of time travel occur. As an
Everettian, he is committed to the existence of the branching structure that
gives rise to the existence of many worlds. But there is additional structure
needed to make the D-CTC model operate in the way he claims it does. For
details, see [10] but briefly, he is committed to the existence of the Many–
Worlds Multiverse (MWM), and an additional structure I call the Mixed-
State Multiverse (MSM).
The most obvious interpretation of the multiverse of which Deutsch is
making use to ground the D-CTC model is the MWM. But there is an im-
mediate problem with this interpretation of Deutsch’s model. Imagine a time
traveler traveling from t = 2 back in time to t = 1. She cannot be traveling
into her own past, because her presence there would change it, leading to a
different future evolution of the wavefunction, undermining the existence of
the branch from which she came. She needs to travel to an already existent
branch with an identical copy of herself at t = 1. The problem is, according
to the Everett interpretation, there would be no such branch. Since the state
of the world at t = 1 in the time traveler’s actual past is, by stipulation,
identical to the state of the world at t = 1 in the universe into which she is
traveling, there would never have been a branching event that had created
multiple copies of the world. The existence of this destination world is not
consistent with the branching structure of the standard Everett interpreta-
tion. Deutsch cannot be relying on the structure of MWM for his solution
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to the paradoxes of time travel.
The existence of the MSM is necessary for solutions of the following kind
to obtain:
In all universes the observer approaches the chronology-violating
region on a trajectory which would go back in time. But only in
half of them does the observer remain on that trajectory, because
in half the universes there is an encounter with an older version
of the observer after which the younger version changes course
and does not go back in time. After that, both versions live on
into the unambiguous future. [8]
It is the parallel worlds of the MSM that are connected by CTCs. This
structure is not implicit in MWI itself, and is added by Deutsch as a solution
to the paradoxes of time travel.6
Since Deutsch’s metaphysics plays such a central role in the formulation of
his CTC model, it cannot be ignored. It is therefore problematic for quantum
information theorists to adopt this model for analysis in a principle-theoretic
context. Despite their claim to be neutral to questions of interpretation, the
metaphysics is playing a fundamental role in the example.
As a consequence, the ease of fit between principle–theoretic considera-
tions that reify the No Signaling principle in a context where the fundamen-
tality of underlying metaphysical considerations is denied, with a model that
relies crucially on such commitments to yield the predicted behavior under
consideration.
The D-CTC model requires a strong commitment to a particular ontology,
and is therefore the product of a constructive version of quantum theory. On
the constructive view, top–down principles are not considered to have any
fundamental importance, and when they conflict with predictions based on
the ontology and dynamics, they are discarded. The D-CTC model predicts
signaling because of the commitments of the theoretical framework in which
it was developed.
Can we embed the mathematical features of the D-CTC model in a
principle–theoretic framework without making the same metaphysical com-
mitments? As argued in [10], denying the D-CTC model recourse to the
6There is a related result that suggests that Deutsch’s solution to a simple Grandfather
Paradox circuit would not hold if he weren’t explicitly relying on the MSM structure. See
[?].
22
explanatory resources provided by realism about the ontology of MSM will
lead it to make different predications in simple cases, undermining its ability
to solve even the Grandfather Paradox.
The D-CTC model includes elements of both the metaphysical approaches
to quantum theory, and quantum information. Although these two ap-
proaches come into conflict, I believe Deutsch had a consistent view in mind.
His analysis of the power of quantum computation, for example, is based on
parallelism. He considers the increased capabilities of a quantum computer
to be proof of the existence of the parallel worlds in which the many com-
putations necessarily must take place. Although this strong metaphysical
commitment to the existence of parallel worlds is a minority view among
contemporary QIT researchers, it is not strictly in conflict with it. It is in
conflict, however, with the purely operationalist interpretation of quantum
mechanics that leads to the principle–theoretic conception of fundamental
physical theories.
From the constructive perspective, “principles” are corollaries of the con-
structive theory. And as such, if the dynamics that governs the behavior
of the ontology changes (as in this nonlinear extension of QM), then the
corollaries will potentially cease to hold. Deutsch holds to the constructive
picture even with respect to the consistency condition and the evolutionary
principle. These are explainable by virtue of his expanded ontology. In fact,
without the particular features of his ontic picture constraining the possible
outputs of the CTCs, the model won’t work in precisely the way he says it
does.
5.3 Bub-Stairs Consistency
Another minor conflict with Deutsch’s approach arises in the Bub and Stairs
paper, and is related to the point about nonlocality and relativity from above.
Bub and Stairs argue that their consistency condition allows for a “radio
to the past”, or a protocol for sending classical information back in time.
They contend that the existence of this protocol opens the door to temporal
paradox. As mentioned in Section 3.4.2, I believe that Deutsch’s consistency
condition wold apply to this classical information channel as well.
The evidence for this claim is comes from the fact that Deutsch, as an
Everettian, would deny that there was any principled distinction between
classical information and quantum information. Ultimately, classical infor-
mation supervenes on quantum systems. In order to be consistent with his
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broader view on the interpretation of quantum theory, he must treat the
classical domain and the quantum domain as subject to the same laws, par-
ticularly one as fundamental as a consistency condition.
In fact, in his paper, he explicitly states that he is conceiving of compu-
tation for the purposes of this argument as
a representative physical process—representing the behavior of
general physical systems under the unfamiliar circumstances of
chronology violation. [8]
He develops a standard form for a CTC-assisted quantum circuit for the pur-
poses of defining his consistency condition in a simple way. But he says that
any spacetime bounded network, which he uses to represent general phys-
ical systems, can be trivially transformed into a denotationally equivalent
standard form, which localize any closed loop of information onto a CTC.
...[T]he transformed version would be intuitively very different
from the original one which might represent a time traveler, whereas
the transformed version appears to represent an ordinary space
traveler meeting a time traveler who spontaneously comes into
existence as an identical twin of the space traveler, exists for a fi-
nite period of time on an “eternal” loop, and then ceases to exist.
[8]
It is clear that Deutsch takes these quantum-circuit representations to be
completely general. Therefore, his consistency condition should apply to all
physical systems.
Bub and Stairs consider the radio to the past protocol to be potentially
paradoxical because they insist on a strict distinction between the classical
domain and the quantum domain. They say that they see their consistency
condition as allowing for a “radio to the past”, which opens the door for the
reemergence of the time travel paradoxes in the classical domain. This comes
from the fact that they are implicitly taking on a Heisenberg (or operational-
ist) picture, which is characteristic of quantum information, but is rejected
by the realist approaches to the interpretation of quantum theory. This is
the same problem we saw above: the tenets of the quantum information-
theoretic interpretation of quantum theory are doing work behind the scenes
to justify the approach to the problem.
And finally, it should be noted that even in a purely classical context,
there are analogues of Deutsch’s consistency condition that are taken equally
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scientifically seriously (e.g. [13] and [16]). So even if they argue that Deutsch’s
consistency condition only applies to quantum information, there are consis-
tency conditions in reserve ready to step in.
6 Conclusion
The considerable recent interest among the quantum information community
in the D-CTC model has produced genuinely interesting results. The BHW
circuit and its use in the Nonlocal Signaling protocol are considerable contri-
butions to our understanding of how quantum systems behave in nonlinear
extensions of quantum theory.
However, we must be sensitive to the fact that there are significant con-
straints on the generality of the D-CTC model. Its formulation presupposes
significant metaphysical commitments, and is therefore applicable only in
contexts where those metaphysical commitments are shared. Failing to rec-
ognize this feature of the model threatens to undermine its application. I
argue that this problem is present in the debate in the quantum information
literature, in particular in the attempts to impose the No-Signaling Principle
on the framework in which the system is being analyzed.
Because of these underlying commitments, the D-CTC model serves as
an important example for the divergence between the principle-theoretic ap-
proaches to quantum theory, and the more metaphysically robust construc-
tive approaches. Deutsch himself is unambiguously an advocate of the latter,
and the model is arguably incoherent on the former approach.
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